Binghamton University

The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB)
Philosophy Faculty Scholarship

Philosophy

2009

Free Trade and the Environment
Nicole Hassoun
Binghamton University--SUNY, nhassoun@binghamton.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://orb.binghamton.edu/philosophy_fac
Part of the Philosophy Commons

Recommended Citation
Hassoun, Nicole, "Free Trade and the Environment" (2009). Philosophy Faculty Scholarship. 9.
https://orb.binghamton.edu/philosophy_fac/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at The Open Repository @ Binghamton
(The ORB). It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of
The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). For more information, please contact ORB@binghamton.edu.

Spring 2009

51

Free Trade and the Environment
Nicole Hassoun*
What should environmentalists say about free trade? Many environmentalists object to free
trade by appealing the “Race to the Bottom Argument.” This argument is inconclusive, but
there are reasons to worry about unrestricted free trade’s environmental effects nonetheless;
the rules of trade embodied in institutions such as the World Trade Organization may be
unjustifiable. Programs to compensate for trade-related environmental damage, appropriate
trade barriers, and consumer movements may be necessary and desirable. At least environmentalists should consider these alternatives to unrestricted free trade if they do not prevent
the achievement of other important moral objectives, can efficiently reduce environmental
problems, and institutional safeguards can prevent their abuse.

I. Introduction
	What should environmentalists say about free trade? In this paper, I consider the
case for free trade on the assumption that there is an obligation to mitigate environmental problems. Many environmentalists object to free trade by appealing the
“Race to the Bottom Argument.” This argument is inconclusive, considering some
of the empirical evidence regarding free trade’s environmental impact. Although
there is not enough evidence to decide whether free trade will generally be good
or bad for the environment, there is reason to worry about the environmental effects of unrestricted free trade; the rules of trade embodied in institutions such as
the World Trade Organization (WTO) may be unjustifiable. Linkage, consumer
movements (such as the Sustainable Forestry and Fair Trade Initiatives), and trade
barriers may be necessary and desirable. At least, environmentalists should consider
these alternatives to unrestricted free trade if they do not prevent us from achieving
* Philosophy Department, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213. Hassoun is affiliated
with Carnegie Mellon's Program on International Relations and the Center for Bioethics and Health
Law at the University of Pittsburgh. She writes primarily on political philosophy and ethics and focuses,
in particular, on global economic and environmental justice. She is also interested in methodological
issues in philosophy and the other social sciences. Her articles have been accepted in journals such as
the American Philosophical Quarterly, Public Affairs Quarterly, and Utilitas. The author thanks Leif
Wenar, Darrel Moellendorf, Bill Oberdick, Jason Matteson, Nicholas Weinhold, Michael Goodheart,
Luc Bovens, Sarah Wright, Will Braynen, John Farnum, Teddy Seidenfeld, Thomas Christiano, Gillian
Brock, Michael Gill, Jerry Gaus, Allen Buchanan, Geoffrey Brenan, and referees for Environmental
Ethics, John M. Gowdy and Thomas Micheal Power, for helpful comments. Thanks are also due to
audiences at the University of Colorado, the University of Delaware, the University of Tennessee,
the American Philosophical Association, the University of North Carolina, and especially the Vienna
International Summer University at which predecessors to this paper were presented. Finally, the author
is thankful for the support she received from the American Association and the Earhart Foundation
during the course of the project. She sincerely apologizes to anyone she has forgotten to mention.
This essay expands upon some ideas in Nicole Hassoun, “Free Trade, Poverty, and the Environment,”
Public Affairs Quarterly 22, no. 4 (2008): 353–80. This essay’s second half also draws on many of
the arguments in that paper in considering objections to using trade policy to protect the environment.
That paper, however, also considers an argument for free trade from a concern for the global poor.
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other important moral objectives, environmental impact assessments suggest they
can efficiently reduce environmental problems, and institutional safeguards can
prevent their abuse.
II. Normative Framework
The world is beset with serious environmental problems. Climate change is happening.1 Acid rain, water pollution, desertification, extinctions, and destruction of
rain forest are well documented.2 Many of these problems could have devastating
consequences for humans, other species, ecosystems, and even the biosphere.3
There are many reasons to care about these problems. Some are anthropocentric or
human-based. Others are nonanthropocentric starting from a concern for individual
animals or plants,4 ecosystems or the biosphere.5 Most environmentalists can agree,
however, that a good environmental ethic requires ameliorating environmental
problems.
Consider, for instance, how those who are only concerned about sustainable
development for humans’ sakes might argue. Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of present generations without undermining the ability of
future generations to meet their own needs. Environmental problems such as climate
change and water pollution impose direct non-negligible risks of serious harm to
humans in all generations. Such environmental problems, in virtue of threatening
nonhuman individuals, other species, and ecosystems, also indirectly pose risks
of serious harm to humans in future generations.6 Those who are concerned about
sustainable development have reason to mitigate environmental problems.
Next, consider how an animal welfare ethicist might argue for mitigating environmental problems. Peter Singer advances what is perhaps the most famous
animal welfare theory. According to Singer, what matters is maximizing pleasure
and minimizing pain for all sentient creatures.7 Environmental problems such as
desertification and destruction of rain forest impose non-negligible risk of serious
1 Stephen M. Gardiner, “The Global Warming Tragedy and the Dangerous Illusion of the Kyoto
Protocol,” Ethics and International Affairs 18, no. 1 (2004): 23–41.
2 United Nations Environment Program, “Environment for Development” (2008), http://www.unep.
org.
3 Clark Wolf, “Anthropogenic Climate Change and Intergenerational Justice,” in Justice Between
Generations, ed. Axel Gosseries and Lukas H. Meyer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). Hillary Mayell, “Climate Studies Point to More Floods in This Century,” National Geographic News, 30
January 2002, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2002/01/0130_020130_greatfloods.html. Dale
Jamieson, “Adaptation, Mitigation, and Justice,” in Perspectives on Climate Change: Science, Economics, Politics, Ethics, ed. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Richard Howarth, Advances in the Economics
of Environmental Resources, vol. 5 (New York: Elsevier, 2005).
4 Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
5 Arne Naess, The Selected Works of Arne Naess, ed. Harold Glasser (New York: Springer, 2005).
vols. 1–10.
6 Gardiner, “Global Warming Tragedy.”
7 Singer, Practical Ethics.
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harm to many sentient species.8 So those who care about animal welfare might
conclude that there is reason to mitigate such problems.
Third, consider what those who think we must treat all teleological subjects of a
life as members of our moral community might say about environmental problems.
Tom Regan gives one account of what it means to say we must treat all teleological subjects of a life as members of our moral community. He says a creature is
the subject of a life when it has beliefs, desires, perception, memory, identity, a
sense of (its own) future, emotions, preferences, interests, the ability to act on and
pursue goals, and the ability to fare well or poorly.9 Regan believes that most yearold mammals have such lives and that being the subject of a life is necessary and
sufficient for moral consideration. On Regan’s theory, we cannot harm creatures
that deserve moral consideration except in self-defense and similarly extraordinary circumstances. Anthropogenic climate change and many other environmental
problems impose non-negligible risk of serious harm on teleological centers of a
life.10 So, on Regan’s theory, we must mitigate these problems.
Finally, consider an environmental ethic on which we should protect ecosystems
and the biosphere for their own sakes.11 Because environmental problems will almost certainly eliminate some species and reduce biodiversity, such problems will
probably negatively impact ecosystems and the biosphere. Even if humans could
completely adapt to environmental problems, something that is almost certainly
impossible, mitigation, would be necessary to protect many parts of nature that
cannot adapt.12 So those who believe ecosystems and the biosphere deserve moral
consideration should agree that we must mitigate environmental problems at least
a little.
	Many of the environmental ethics canvassed require much more than mitigating
environmental problems. We might, for instance, mitigate environmental problems
without maximizing pleasure and avoiding pain for all sentient life, respecting teleological centers of a life, or protecting ecosystems and the biosphere. There are
also many other environmental ethics on which there is an obligation to mitigate
environmental problems. But, because environmental problems are likely to harm
humans, other species, ecosystems, and the biosphere, most environmentalists will
agree that there is an obligation to mitigate environmental problems.13 So, in this
paper I do not try to find the limit of our obligations or arbitrate between these

08

Gardiner, “Global Warming Tragedy.”

09 Joseph Des Jardins, Environmental Ethics: An Introduction to Environmental Philosophy, 4th ed.

(Stamford Conn.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 2006), chap. 5.
10 Gardiner, “Global Warming Tragedy.”
11 Naess, Selected Works.
12 Gardiner, “The Global Warming Tragedy and the Dangerous Illusion of the Kyoto Protocol.”
13 For explicit arguments for this conclusion, see Axel Gosseries, “Cosmopolitan Luck Egalitarianism and Climate Change,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, suppl. vol. (2007). Also see Henry Shue,
“Global Environment and International Inequality,” in Environmental Ethics: What Really Matters, What
Really Works, ed. David Schmidtz and Elizabeth Willott (New York: Oxford University, 2002).
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different theories. I simply assume that, in terms of a sound environmental ethic,
there is an obligation to mitigate environmental problems.14
III. The Environmentalists’ Case Against Free Trade
Environmentalists often argue that free trade harms the environment. They suggest, for instance, that trade increases production and transportation. Production
and transportation, the environmentalists argue, produce waste and use scarce sinks
(such as the atmosphere) that absorb waste.15 Although these environmentalists
recognize that free trade brings technological change, they hold that new technologies create at least as many problems as they solve. Finally, these environmentalists
argue that free trade generates incentives for countries to reduce environmental
regulation, thereby creating environmental problems.16 Most of these claims are,
essentially, empirical. The last worry about regulation, however, is backed by an
interesting theoretical argument. So, in the next two subsections, I set out and
critique this portion of the environmentalists’ argument against free trade. I then
turn to the empirical evidence regarding free trade’s environmental impact.
The Race to the Bottom Argument
Perhaps the most famous argument for the conclusion that free trade will decrease
environmental standards is the “Race to the Bottom Argument.” The basic idea
is simple. Free trade makes it easier for industries to locate in different countries.
Countries have different environmental regulations. So companies have incentives
to move to countries with laxer regulatory standards. Because countries realize this,
and want to retain or attract industry, they have an incentive to reduce environmental
regulations. Ceteris paribus, these incentives lead companies to move to countries
with laxer regulations (a.k.a., pollution havens) and countries to reduce regulations.17

14 There are important questions about what mix of mitigation and adaptation to environmental
problems like climate change is appropriate and who should bear the burden of paying for the necessary changes.In this paper, I am not concerned with these questions, however. For discussion, see n.
13.
15 Withering attacks on free trade abound in the popular as well as scholarly literature with authors
arguing that the benefits of free trade are exaggerated while their social and environmental costs are
neglected. See, for instance, Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (New York: Norton:
2002).
16 For some such arguments, see Herman Daly, “Sustainable Growth? No Thank You,” in The Case
against the Global Economy and for a Turn toward the Local, ed. Jerry Mander and Edward Goldsmith
(San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1996).
17 A similar argument can be made for investment—insofar as pollution abatement lowers profit,
companies in pollution havens may be more likely to attract capital. See Rhys Jenkins, “Environmental
Regulation and International Competitiveness: A Review of Literature and Some European Evidence,”
The United Nations University Institute for New Technologies Discussion Paper Series, Mastricht:
United Nations University, January 1998 draft.
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Because many companies relocate, they emit more pollution than they would
without free trade.18
Environmentalists can allow for the possibility that non-trade-related incentives
to raise regulatory standards might balance out or even outweigh the incentives free
trade creates to lower standards. But, even if standards do not fall, the “Race to the
Bottom Argument” implies that free trade will have caused more environmental
damage than would have otherwise occurred. If a race is occurring, standards would
have been higher without free trade.
	Critique of the “Race to the Bottom Argument”
One potential objection to the “Race to the Bottom Argument” starts from the
observation that free trade may induce economic growth. This growth may allow
countries to avoid downward pressure on environmental standards. When countries
are wealthier, they might be able to maintain their current levels of regulation even
in the face of competitive pressure. It is even possible that free trade will increase
demand for environmental regulation as it increases economic growth.19 Regulatory standards may start to rise if countries can afford stricter regulatory standards
as free trade increases their incomes. Countries may even reduce pollution and the
severity of environmental problems more quickly with free trade. This is known
as the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) hypothesis.20
The “Race to the Bottom Argument” might be correct in asserting that free trade
has increased and will continue to increase competitive pressure on industries. But
if labor costs swamp the costs of complying with environmental regulations, industries may not respond to incentives to locate in countries with fewer environmental
regulations. To survive in a freely trading economy, industries may, instead, have
to move to the countries with the lowest labor costs, even if those countries have
high environmental standards.
	What is actually happening and what will happen in the future as a result of free
trade is not clear a priori. It is possible that the “Race to the Bottom Argument” is
right. But it is also possible that the argument has never been correct.
Furthermore, there are many other potential problems with the “Race to the
Bottom Argument.” Companies may prefer not to increase pollution, for instance,
even in countries with lax regulatory standards. It may be better for companies to
18 For further discussion of this argument, see, for instance: Durwood Zaelke, Paul Orbuch, and
Robert Housman eds., Trade and the Environment: Law, Economics, and Policy (Washington D.C.:
Island Press, 1993). Also see Edward Goldsmith, “Global Trade and the Environment,” in Mander and
Goldsmith, The Case against the Global Economy.
19 There are other explanations for why free trade might lead to falling rather than rising pollution
levels too. There may, for instance, be economies of scale in pollution abatement or structural changes
that occur in developing country economies with free trade reforms.
20 E. B. Barbier, “Introduction to the Special Issue on Environmental Kuznets Curves,” Environment
and Development Economics 2, no. 4 (1997): 369–81.
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invest in environmentally sound technology at the outset than to face the possibility
of having to adapt to rising standards in the future. Alternately, other trade-related
incentives may counterbalance the impact of a race if one is happening. Trade might,
for instance, yield new technologies that reduce environmental damage. (Although,
of course, trade might also yield technologies that increase environmental damage.)
The important point is just that the “Race to the Bottom Argument” is not decisive
on its own.
IV. Free Trade in Practice
The argument for a race to the bottom provides one mechanism through which
free trade might contribute to environmental problems. I have already noted, however, that there are other ways that free trade might contribute to such problems.
Free trade might, for instance, increase waste or eliminate scarce sinks simply by
increasing the scale of the economy. In this section, I consider some of free trade's
other environmental impacts as well.21
One of the most extensive studies of trade’s impact on the environment is
Frankel and Rose’s “Is Trade Good or Bad for the Environment? Sorting out the
Causality.” Frankel and Rose looked for correlations between free trade, SO2, NO2,
CO2, deforestation, and energy depletion rates.22 They found that trade has had a
beneficial effect on deforestation, SO2, NO2, and energy depletion rates and has
had an insignificant negative impact on CO2.23
Grossman and Krueger completed a similar study with similar results.24 They found
evidence that is consistent with the EKC hypothesis: they found that countries

21 There are two broad classes of studies that have direct bearing on the case for a race to the bottom in
particular. The first set looks at pollution abatement costs and trade flows. These studies were pioneered
by James Toby, “The Effects of Domestic Environmental Policies on Patterns of World Trade: An
Empirical Test,” Kyklos 43, no. 2 (1990): 191–209. He finds no impact of regulatory costs on industry
location. The second class of studies look at the location of clean vs. dirty industries post liberalization.
See Patrick Low and Andrew Yeats, “Do ‘Dirty’ Industries Migrate?” in International Trade and the
Environment, ed. Patrick Low, World Bank Working Paper 159 (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1992).
Also see Robert Lucas, David Wheeler, and Hemamala Hettige, “Economic Development, Environmental
Regulation, and International Migration of Toxic Industrial Production 1960–88,” in Patrick Low, ed.,
International Trade and the Environment, World Bank Working Paper 159 (Washington D.C.: World
Bank, 1992). Finally see Muthukumara Mani and David Wheeler, “In Search of Pollution Havens?
Dirty Industry in the World Economy 1960–1995,” in Trade, Global Policy and Environment, ed. Per
G. Fredriksson (Washington: World Bank, 1997).
22 They also look at correlations between free trade and access to clean water.
23 This is so once instrumental variables are used to capture the impact of income levels and environmental regulation on trade and avoid endogeniety problems. Of course, other factors could explain
the correlations they find. See Jeffrey Frankel and Andrew Rose, “Is Trade Good or Bad for the Environment? Sorting out the Causality,” Review of Economics and Statistics 87, no. 1 (2005): 3–9 (page
numbers from the September 2004 draft).
24 Grossman and Kruger use panel data. See Gene Grossman and Alan Krueger, “Environmental
Impacts of the North American Free Trade Agreement,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 3914 (Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1991).
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emissions of SO2, for instance, increase until their GNPs per capita are between
4–5,000 U.S. dollars per year.25 Figure 1 shows an EKC that peaks when countries’ GNPs reach about 4,000 U.S. dollars.
1420
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Figure 1. Environmental Kuznets curve for sulfur emissions. Source: Panayotou (1993) and Stern, Common, and
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Figure 2. Projected Emissions of SO2 Using EKC and World Bank Projections. From
David Stern. “The Rise and Fall of the Environmental Kuznets Curve,” World Development 32, no. 8 (2004): 1437.

economists argue that the EKC only holds for local pollutants such as SO2 and NOx,
not for pollutants such as CO2 that have far-ranging impacts and are most likely to
lead to climate change.30 Others argue that the statistical basis for historical EKC
26 Nemat Shafik and Sushenjit Bandyopadhyay, “Economic Growth and Environmental Quality:
Time Series and Cross-country Evidence,” background paper prepared for World Development Report
1992: Development and the Environment (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
27 Amounts expressed in 1985 U.S. dollar purchasing power parity except for Panayotou (1995).
28 David Stern. “The Rise and Fall of the Environmental Kuznets Curve,” World Development 32,
no. 8 (2004): 1437.
29 See Steve Charnovitz, “World Trade and the Environment: A Review of the New WTO Report,”
Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 12, no. 2 (2000): 523–41. Also see Håkan
Nordström and Scott Vaughan, Trade and Environment, World Trade Organization Special Studies 4
(Geneva: World Trade Organization, 1999).
30 Werner Antweiler, Brian Copeland, and M. Scott Taylor, “Is Free Trade Good for the Environment?” Department of Economics University of British Columbia Working Paper Number 98–11,
Vancouver, B.C.: University of British Columbia, 1998.
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studies is weak and that growth, as the environmentalist contends, may even be
correlated with monotonic increases in overall environmental degradation.31
Fortunately, it is not necessary to discuss the technical problems with these studies here.32 Even granting that the data supporting the EKC are correct, the EKC
hypothesis needs further defense. Some argue that the data may be explained by
the fact that countries usually start importing pollution intensive goods when their
incomes increase. There is some evidence that pollution intensive manufacturing
is shifting to developing countries.33 So, we do not know what will happen when
everyone’s income increases.34 Obviously, someone has to produce the pollution
intensive goods if they are still consumed.
Significant increases in environmental problems may occur even if environmental
conditions eventually improve in all countries. The costs of trade-induced growth
may outweigh the benefits. If, for instance, global warming melts the polar ice
caps, many ecosystems will be irreversibly damaged. This damage will probably
increase the rate of natural disasters and transmission of devastating diseases like
malaria.35 Other species and ecosystems may also suffer.36
The empirical evidence on how free trade will impact the environment canvassed
here is not conclusive.37 We lack sufficiently rigorous data to predict whether the
net effect of trade-induced growth will be good or bad for the environment.38 But
31

Stern, “The Rise and Fall of the Environmental Kuznets Curve,” p. 1423.
Some worry about the quality and representativeness of the data on environmental degradation.
Others worry generally about heteroskedacity, endogeneity, and omitted variable bias. For an overview,
see ibid, pp. 1419–39.
33 Vivek Suri and Duane Chapman, “Economic Growth, Trade and the Energy: Implications for the
Environmental Kuznets Curve,” Ecological Economics 25 (1998): 195–208.
34 See Grossman and Krueger, “Environmental Impacts of the North American Free Trade Agreement.” Some also argue that one cannot generalize from what has happened in the past to what will
happen in the future for other reasons. The early studies of the EKC use statistical methods that do
not support generalization. If studies estimate correlations using fixed-effects models, and GDP is an
integrated variable, they must make sure the EKC regressions do not co-integrate to avoid spurious
estimates. Few studies completed before 1999 look for co-integration. See Stern, “The Rise and Fall
of the Environmental Kuznets Curve,” p. 1423.
35 Jamieson, “Adaptation, Mitigation, and Justice.”
36 Mayell, “Climate Studies Point to More Floods in This Century.”
37 Studies also show that the scale effect is not offset by technological change in some sectors.
Evidence suggests that in the agricultural sector, for instance, technological change has not offset
the scale effect. See Commission for Environmental Cooperation of North America, “Free Trade and
the Environment: The Picture Becomes Clearer,” North American Symposium on Understanding the
Linkages between Trade and the Environment (Quebec: Commission for Environmental Cooperation
of North America, 2002), pp. 26–27.
38 There is a different way of challenging the “Race to the Bottom Argument” empirically that is
also worth mentioning. Several economists have looked at whether industries actually tend to move to
low regulation environments from high regulation environments with free trade. Many argue that the
impact of environmental regulation on industry location decisions is very small or non-existent. See
Toby, “The Effects of Domestic Environmental Policies on Patterns of World Trade: An Empirical
Test.” Also see Cees van Beers, “International Trade, Environment, and Sustainable Development,”
in Economics of Sustainable Development: International Perspectives, ed. Mario Cogoy and Karl
32
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no matter what the net effect of free trade on the environment will be, we can be
reasonably certain that free trade will have mixed effects. Some free trade reforms
are probably good for the environment, while others are probably devastating for
the environment.
Consider how free trade in the energy sector is likely to have mixed impacts.
Some energy sources are better for the environment than others. Fossil fuels like coal
and oil are some of the dirtiest energy sources contributing a lot to environmental
problems like climate change. The World Bank suggested that fossil fuel consumption subsidies alone were over 200 billion U.S. dollars in 1992.39 These subsidies,
because they reduce prices, usually increase consumption and pollution. Thus, reducing
these subsidies might mitigate many environmental problems.40 Since other energy
sources, such as wind and geothermal, are better for the environment,41 it would
probably be bad if subsidies for alternative energy sources were eliminated.42
All other things being equal, the obligation to mitigate environmental problems
provides reason to support reforms insofar as they help fulfill this obligation. So,
subsequent sections consider some ways of capturing the environmental benefits
while avoiding the environmental costs of free trade.
Of course, all other things are not equal. Unfettered free trade might be the best
way, for instance, to promote growth or democracy.43 Thus, the best trade policies
may balance environmental improvements against other important moral objectives. But this paper will not consider such tradeoffs.44 Even if they are necessary,
it is important to look for constructive, creative ways of capturing the benefits and
avoiding the costs of free trade for the environment. After all, we need to know
Steininger (Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar, 2006), p. 16. Other factors are probably much more important than environmental standards on industry location decisions. See Low and Yeats, “Do ‘Dirty’
Industries Migrate?” Also see Jenkins, “Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness,”
pp. 14–16. Researchers have found impacts in some industries and races in some countries, however.
See van Beers, “International Trade, Environment, and Sustainable Development.” Also see Jenkins,
“Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness,” pp. 22–23.
39 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Reforming Coal and Electricity
Subsidies,” Annex I Expert Group on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Working Paper No. 2 (Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1997), http://
www.oecd.org//env/docs/cc/gd9770.pdf.
40 If reducing subsidies leads to lower prices and more consumption of coal energy, however, climate
change could even increase as a result. See ibid. The details of this particular example are simply meant
to illustrate the general point; other examples can be given if this case proves to be a poor one.
41 Nicole Hassoun, “The Case for Renewable Energy and a New Energy Plan.” International Journal
of Environmental, Cultural, Economic and Social Sustainability 1, no. 5 (2005): 197–208.
42 Ibid.
43 Certainly, meeting some other moral objectives may reduce environmental problems. If, for
instance, free trade helps the poor then it may also be the best thing for the environment because poor
people contribute greatly to environmental problems. See Nicole Hassoun, “Free Trade, Poverty, and
the Environment,” Public Affairs Quarterly 22, no. 4 (2008): 353–80. Still there will probably be times
when tradeoffs are necessary. Tradeoffs may also be necessary between meeting different environmental
objectives.
44 Further analysis is also necessary to see when using non-trade-related means of mitigating environmental problems is preferable to using trade-related means.
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what ways of reworking the rules of trade or working around them mitigate environmental problems to figure out when (and what) tradeoffs are required. In the
next section, I consider some ways of capturing the benefits and avoiding the costs
of free trade for the environment.
V. Restructuring the Rules of Trade
Environmental ethicists do not have reason to support isolationism or unfettered
free trade. Rather, they have reason to support policies (protectionist or not) that
reduce environmental problems.45 This seemingly innocuous proposition contravenes
international law embodied in institutions like the WTO, however.46 The WTO
makes some provisions for the environment. Article XX of the GATT/WTO agreement suspends the most favored nation and national treatment rules to protect the
environment, for instance. But these provisions are not as broad as those suggested
here. So, if my conclusions are correct, there is reason to consider changing some
of the rules of trade. The WTO might, for instance, require countries benefiting
from trade to compensate for trade-related damage to the environment. The WTO
might, for example, require trading countries to plant new trees to compensate for
the pollution caused by transporting goods long distances.47
More radically, the WTO might allow otherwise impermissible trade barriers if
they mitigate environmental problems. Consider an example of how a trade barrier might help the environment. Suppose that Japan is the main consumer of a
certain kind of hardwood that can only be found in the Amazon. If Japan prohibits
imports of this wood, then, ceteris paribus, less rain forest may be destroyed. The
environment may benefit.
Even individuals can promote free trade that mitigates environmental problems.48
Individuals might, for example, buy Sustainable Forestry Initiative or Fair Trade
certified goods.49 The Sustainable Forestry Initiative certifies that wood products
have been sustainably harvested. And, usually, producers must use environmentally
friendly production processes to gain Fair Trade certification.50 Consumer movements
45

Such reasons are defeasible. Other considerations may yield conflicting recommendations.

46 For more information see World Trade Organization, “The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

(GATT 1947),” Legal texts: GATT 1947 Article XVIII–XXXVIII (Geneva: World Trade Organization,
2006), http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_02_e.htm.
47 We can use environmental impact assessments for trade reforms to determine both what the likely
impact of a reform will be and which compensatory policies are likely to be successful. Some trade
agreements investigate the environmental impacts of their policies upon request.
48 On fair trade, see Mathias Risse, “Fairness in Trade,” Harvard University Working Paper (Boston:
Harvard University, 2006), http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~mrisse/docs/cv0306.pdf. For critique, see
Nicole Hassoun, “Making Free Trade Fair,” Carnegie Mellon University Working Paper (Pittsburgh:
Harvard University, 2008), http://www.hss.cmu.edu/philosophy/hassoun/papers.php.
49 There are many fair trade certification schemes. Some are better than others. See http://www.
fairtrade.org.uk/about_standards.htm and http://www.transfairusa.org/content/certification/overview.
php for examples.
50 Fair trade coffee is usually shade grown, for instance. Coffee produced in this way is grown under the rain forest’s canopy rather than in clearings usually created by burning down rain forests. See
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will probably not ameliorate all of free trade’s negative effects on the environment.
But if many people demand environmentally friendly goods, companies may institute better production standards and, in doing so, greatly mitigate environmental
problems. Altering the WTO (and other international organizations) may help the
Sustainable Forestry and Fair Trade Initiatives. The WTO might require countries
to label goods produced in sustainable ways as Sustainable Forestry Initiative or
Fair Trade certified, for instance. But, consumer action is powerful. When U.S.
consumers demanded dolphin safe tuna, the tuna-fishing industry changed despite
WTO protests.
VI. Objections
There are many ways of changing or working around the rules of trade to reduce
environmental problems. Because some require changing or working around international trade law, in this section, I consider objections to using trade policy to
mitigate environmental problems. In this inquiry, I isolate some of the conditions
that must hold for the above proposals to be acceptable.
Taxes and Other Market Reforms are More Efficient than Trade Barriers
Trade barriers such as tariffs and quotas are among the most controversial trade
policies. One of the primary objectives of institutions such as the WTO is to encourage
countries to reduce trade barriers. Many argue that trade barriers are an inefficient
ways of protecting the environment.51 Tariffs, for instance, are supposed to be
less efficient than other taxes because they have a narrow base (tariffs are usually
applied to individual commodities).52 When taxes apply to more goods or people,
they are harder to avoid and it is the costs associated with people trying to avoid
taxes that make them inefficient. If a tax makes corn more expensive than wheat,
people can purchase wheat instead. People have few alternatives to paying a tax
on food even if food becomes more expensive than other commodities when it is
taxed. It is even harder to avoid a tax on all goods and services. So, the proponent
of unfettered free trade might conclude, we should use taxation (or other market
reforms) to mitigate environmental problems, not trade barriers.
The proponent of free trade is right that we should consider using taxes and other
market reforms to address environmental problems.53 Global taxation or regulations may be wonderfully effective in protecting the environment. We might follow
http://www.fairtrade.org.uk/about_standards.htm and http://www.transfairusa.org/content/certification/
overview.php for further information.
51 van Beers, “International Trade, Environment, and Sustainable Development.”
52 Emmanuel Saez, “Direct or Indirect Tax Instruments for Redistribution: Short-Run versus LongRun,” Journal of Public Economics 88 (2004): 503–18. Also see James Anderson, “The Relative
Inefficiency of Quotas,” Journal of Economic Education 19, no. 1 (1988): 65–81.
53 Some such options are mentioned above, for instance.
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Thomas Pogge’s suggestion to tax natural resources, for instance.54 Emissions
trading schemas like those in the Kyoto protocol are also promising. But which
taxes or market reforms are best depends on many things. In theory, trade barriers
can be just as good and efficient as taxation (or other kinds of market reforms) at
achieving moral objectives.55 Although we cannot go into the details here, there is a
wealth of theoretical and empirical literature in public and international economics
on how different trade barriers and other market reforms affect efficiency.56 Some
trade barriers may be more efficient than other means of achieving moral objectives.57 Finally, even if we granted that, in theory, trade barriers are usually inferior
to other market reforms, the economic models used to estimate the efficiency of
different reforms are often unrealistic.58 Political considerations not included in the
models may, for instance, tell in favor of trade barriers rather than other alternatives.
Developed countries and producers may be more likely to support tariffs than other
taxes. Alternately, the only realistic way to get countries to address environmental
problems may be to threaten them with trade barriers.59 Joseph Stiglitz, formerly
the chief economist at the World Bank, seems to take this view. He argues that
the WTO should allow countries to use trade barriers to sanction the U.S. for not
paying the costs of the damage it causes to the environment.60
	It Is Too Hard To Predict Consequences of Trade Barriers
Those with a libertarian bent might raise a different objection to allowing countries
to use trade barriers when doing so will benefit the environment. They might argue
that the very suggestion presupposes the possibility of fine-tuned social engineering. It is not clear that we have the knowledge we need to decide whether allowing
particular countries to implement particular tariffs will benefit the environment.
Moreover, even if it is possible to analyze the prospects for different tariffs to benefit
the environment, this analysis may be expensive and difficult. Institutions such as
the WTO have enough to do without evaluating every possible tariff. The objector
might contend that this objection is particularly pressing in light of the fact that
those seeking protection from competition often use the guise of environmentalism
to garner support for unfair trade barriers that do not benefit (or even harm) the
54 Thomas Pogge, “Severe Poverty as a Human Rights Violation,” in Thomas Pogge, ed., Freedom
from Poverty as a Human Right: Who Owes What to the Very Poor? (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2006).
55 Emmanuel Saez, “Direct or Indirect Tax Instruments for Redistribution: Short-Run versus LongRun,” Journal of Public Economics 88 (2004): 503–18.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Robert E. Baldwin, “The Political Economy of Trade Policy,” Journal of Economic Perspectives
3, no. 4 (1989): 119–35.
59 On this see Daniel Esty, “Bridging the Trade-Environment Divide,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 15, no. 3 (2001): 113–30.
60 Joseph Stiglitz, “A New Agenda for Global Warming,” The Economists’ Voice, July 2006.
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environment. U.S. firms that want import restrictions on Canadian softwood lumber may be using the environment as an excuse for protectionism.61 Protectionists
seeking profit may even trick environmentalists into supporting environmentally
harmful protectionism.
Although there is something to this objection, it is not clear that it is correct. It
might not be very expensive or difficult to figure out that some trade barriers will
benefit the environment. Some trade agreements provide environmental impact
assessments of their policies already.62 Nor need institutions such as the WTO
be responsible for doing the relevant calculations. Perhaps international trade organizations could allow countries to use trade barriers to benefit the environment
as long as countries declare their intentions to use these barriers publicly and are
prepared to justify their barriers if challenged. Non-governmental organizations and
academics might, then, help developing countries that lack the capacity or resources
to do the requisite assessment. The details would need to be worked out carefully,
and it is important to make sure impact assessments would stay current.
At least, however, if good assessments support using trade barriers to mitigate
environmental problems, institutions such as the WTO should allow the barriers.
To mitigate the threat of hidden protectionism masquerading as concern for the
environment, however, international trade organizations’ dispute resolution panels
would probably have to create standards for judging whether protectionist measures
will mitigate environmental problems.63 Fortunately, there is some sign that this
may already be happening for some kinds of environmentally motivated trade policies.64 In the future, these organizations might even allow protectionism that is not
environmentally motivated as long as it is best for the environment. Some collusion
by those seeking protection from competition and those genuinely concerned about
the environment may be best for the environment. It may be possible to educate
those who care about the environment so that they can protest against hidden protectionism that does not benefit the environment. It is risky to allow protectionism
since it can cause environmental problems. But, the fact that protectionism can
hurt the environment does not tell against using protectionism (when possible) to
61 Brink Lindsey, Mark A. Groombridge, and Prakash Loungani, “Nailing the Homeowner: The
Economic Impact of Trade Protection of the Softwood Lumber Industry,” CATO Trade Policy Analysis
11 (2006): 1–16.
62 See World Trade Organization, “Sustainability and Environmental Impact Assessment of Trade
Negotiations” (Geneva: World Trade Organization, 2006), http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/
public_forum_e/session_25_num9_e.htm.
63 Perhaps such panels could also decide whether a trade policy that does help the environment can
be justified in light of competing considerations.
64 If it is difficult it is to tell whether or not trade policies will protect the environment, the WTO
might remain skeptical of trade policies not primarily motivated by concern for the environment. There
is room here for fruitful policy-relevant research on the conditions under which industries should be
allowed to push environmental protection. See Charnovitz, “World Trade and the Environment.” Also
see Nordström and Vaughan, Trade and Environment.
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benefit the environment. If restricting imports of Canadian softwood lumber does
help the environment, restrictions may be justifiable.
	Using Trade Policy to Reduce Environmental Problems is Unjust
Perhaps one could object that using trade policy to reduce environmental problems is unjust. One might argue that because people in different countries have
different preferences, resources, and needs, each country should get to decide what
it wants to do about environmental problems.65 Even though some countries are
ruled by despots, countries’ decisions may require respect. One might suggest that
preventing countries from fulfilling their preferences is unjust because it is paternalistic and violates sovereignty.66 Respecting China’s sovereignty, for instance,
might require allowing it to set its own priorities even if it foolishly chooses not
to protect the environment. Outsiders may not be justified in using trade policy
to get China to protect the environment even if it is in China’s best interests to do
so.67 The objector might conclude that countries concerned about environmental
problems should only address problems within their own borders. Institutions such
as the WTO should prohibit trade policy intended to get other countries to protect
the environment and countries should refrain from pursuing such policy.
There are at least three problems with this argument. First, using trade policy
to protect the environment may not be paternalistic. Such policy may neither be
intended to promote other interests of countries nor succeed in doing so. (Some
countries might do better to pollute, for instance.) Second, using trade policy to
protect the environment may not violate sovereignty. If sovereignty is unlimited,
sovereign states should be able to impose whatever trade barriers they want. If
sovereignty is limited, it may not violate sovereignty to use trade policy to get a
country to protect the environment. Finally, even if using trade policy to mitigate
environmental problems is paternalistic and infringes on sovereignty that does not
show that such policy is unjust. It may be justifiable to violate sovereignty even if
doing so is paternalistic as long as doing so is necessary to mitigate environmental
problems. Some theories of justice may support the conclusion that using trade
policy to mitigate environmental problems is unjust. But in the absence of such a
theory, this objection does not succeed.

65 In defense of this argument, see van Beers, “International Trade, Environment, and Sustainable
Development.”
66 This argument appears throughout the development literature and is given by all kinds of official
organizations. See, for instance, European Union, “Economic Partnership Agreements and Free Trade—
Myths and Reality,” EU-Uganda News: A Quarterly News Letter of the Delegation of the European
Commission in Uganda December (2004).
67 Countries often appeal to the value of sovereignty to justify environmentally destructive practices.
For discussion, see Durwood et. al., Trade and the Environment.
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	Allowing Trade Policy to Protect the Environment May Impede Development
Finally, it may harm the global poor to allow countries to use trade policy to get
other countries to protect the environment. China and India (as well as the U.S.)
are likely targets for such policy. These countries emit a lot of green house gas.
But China and India are developing countries. They may be justified in using their
resources to foster the development that will eliminate poverty and it may be necessary to increase emissions to do so. If countries such as China and India are forced
to protect the environment, they may also have to reduce spending on poverty
relief.
This is a serious concern. But even granting that it would be impermissible to require
developing countries to protect the environment if doing so impeded development,
the objection is not conclusive. The objection only shows that it is impermissible
to use trade policy to get developing countries to protect the environment without
also helping them reduce poverty. Countries imposing trade barriers that impede
development but help the environment might implement other policies that compensate for these barriers’ negative impacts on the poor. The lesson here is quite
general. If using trade policy to protect the environment interferes with other things
that matter, it may still be acceptable for a country to use trade policy to protect the
environment as long as it compensates for those barriers' negative impacts. The rents
countries can gain from imposing some barriers might even be used to compensate
for those barriers’ negative effects.
VII. Conclusion
In this paper, I considered the case for free trade on the assumption that there is
an obligation to mitigate environmental problems. I suggested that the “Race to
the Bottom Argument” against free trade is inconclusive. I then considered some
empirical evidence regarding free trade’s environmental impact. Although there
is not enough evidence to conclude that free trade will generally be good or bad
for the environment, I showed that there is reason to worry about unrestricted free
trade’s environmental effects. Linkage, consumer movements, and trade barriers
may be necessary and desirable. At least these ways of reworking or working around
the rules of trade embodied in institutions such as the World Trade Organization
deserve serious consideration if they can efficiently reduce environmental problems
without interfering with other things that matter.

